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Synopsis
From Aristotle’s Poetics, literature and logic have been companions in approach-
ing the hypothetical realm of the ‘what if.’ In this paper, I focus on the combina-
torial possibilities of logic to see how mathematics becomes an important tool for
the Modernist text’s aesthetic appeal to anti-representational and self-enclosed
systemic autonomy. Is mathematical discourse autonomous vis-a`-vis external
reality? Can literary Modernism achieve textual autonomy that goes against re-
alistic verisimilitude by following mathematical discourse? Though literary texts
often negotiate formal systems with sophisticated governing logics, can literature
itself become a logico-mathematical system? I trace the dialectic of form and
system in the short stories of Italo Calvino, known for his interest in mathemati-
cal discourse as an Oulipian ‘proceduralist.’ Calvino weaves this dialectic around
political concerns like the machinic logic of modernity and technocratic capital-
ism. ‘Numbers in the Dark’ mythicizes mathematical error that goes against
systemicity and leads to an opposition between logic and calculative rationality.
In ‘The Burning of the Abominable House,’ computer becomes a narrative de-
vice to play with permutations and combinations of the real that conspire against
the construction of a single reality. Evoking Oulipo’s position against chance, I
bring in Quentin Meillassoux’s readings of Cantorian ‘transfinite’ to distinguish
chance from radical contingency. As we shall see, this distinction speaks to the
mathematical tension between system and form in the Modernist literary text.
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1. Mathematics and Literature: Between Form and System
What is form and what is system? Are they the same or different? How
do we invoke mathematical thought to consider the relation of form and
system in literature? One could question the efficacy and relevance of bring-
ing in mathematics to study literature. To set the point straight, I do not
have any grand narrative of mathematics and literature to offer here. In
other words, I am not making a global argument about reading all literary
texts through mathematics. In fact, I think, a literary text must demand
a mathematical reading for there to be one. In the wake of recent mathe-
matical approaches to literature ([11, 6, 14, 10]),1 what we are beginning to
realise is that mathematics, like politics, love etc., is an embedded trope in
certain literary texts. To give one example from this new critical interest,
Nina Engelhardt, in her book [14] on Modernist literature and mathematics
advocates exploring “the meeting of modernism and mathematics from the
perspective of history of maths and with a main focus on literature, that
is, on works of fiction that engage with modern maths as part of broader
developments in the first half of twentieth century” (page 2). To build on
this, let me say that particular literary texts that make this specific appeal
to mathematics as a discourse demand mathematical reading. My lens to
study literary texts that build mathematical and logical questions into them,
will be philosophy of mathematics which involves philosophical extensions
based on mathematical developments. Italo Calvino’s manifold interest in
mathematical discourse will be my historical justification for the following
investigation into his texts.
I would argue that a literary text does not just have a form or forms. But it
also takes us through a certain number of forms that are part of its narrative
world. A form becomes a system when it has a clear set of unflinching
rules. Form for its own part could well be a tattered entity. System on
the other hand requires a certain degree of operativity and cohesion. In
literary texts that use mathematical themes and structures, the question
1See Steven Connor’s book, In Defence of Quantity: Living by Numbers [11], for a
cultural and literary history of numbers. See also Baylee Brits’ book, Literary Infinities
[6], for a mathematical reading of infinity in writers like Borges, Beckett and Coetzee. I
would like to place my book Beckett, Lacan and the Mathematical Writing of the Real [10]
in the same critical tradition.
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is whether the texts approach mathematical structure as form or system.
This will be my central question in reading mathematically oriented literary
texts i.e. the Modernist short stories of Italo Calvino. I am interested in
teasing out the philosophical implications of mathematical discourse as a
system for literature. While form is open to deformations, including its own
deformations, system is a neat and closed structure. As we shall see, forms
invoked in a literary text may speak to a logic that in turn may demand a
reading through philosophy of mathematics. Logic could in itself be a bridge
between mathematics and literature.
To begin with the ancient relation of literature with logic, at the beginning of
the ninth section in Poetics [1], Aristotle reflects: “[. . . ] it is not the function
of the poet to relate what has happened, but what may happen—what is
possible according to the law of probability and necessity” (page 35). This
statement foregrounds the bond between logic and literature. To go back
to Aristotle’s passage above, if the literary is a domain of possibilities that
operates through the modal auxiliary verb, ‘may,’ its happenings belong in
the counterfactual world. More importantly, this ‘may’ necessarily ties the
idea of chance to the literary world of probabilities. What is the function
of necessity here? Can necessity construct a system from the chance-ridden
form in certain literary texts? Form may have chance in it as a component but
system seems to abhor chance and randomness. This dialectical tension of
chance and system in European literary modernism makes a mathematical
and logical approach necessary. This happens all the more when writers
become increasingly aware of the two linguistic axes of literary creativity:
selection of ideas and themes wherein anything may happen to get into a
text and textual combination in which a potential totality of possibilities
is decided and sealed. Logic is intrinsic to this creative process. To echo
Stephane Mallarme´’s famous line, does this textual throw of dice abolish
chance or does it locate chance by patterning it? When we make a pattern
from chance, does it remain chance? What do we call such a patterned matrix
of chance? Form or system? Let us follow this trail of questions.
To ground the link between mathematics and Modernist literature, if chaos
(including chaos of forms, at war with one another) and system make up one
dialectical pair, autonomy (the text’s independence from realistic reference
to external world) and verisimilitude (the text’s representational dependence
on external reality) form another complex couple. In European Modernism,
when literary texts appeal toward autonomy, as opposed to invoking repre-
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sentational correspondence with extra-textual reality, mathematics and logic
become natural allies in offering literature, a model of liberative autonomy
from realism. Mathematical discourse claims to be relatively autonomous vis-
a`-vis reality. This is the Platonic trajectory that runs through philosophy of
mathematics. It situates mathematical objects in another reality. For Pla-
tonism, mathematics has an autonomous world of its own. It is not a part of
our world. To give an example, the number 10 does not depend on ten apples
that we encounter in the material world. The number 10 does not even exist
in the phenomenal world. It has its own independent abode in the world of
mathematical ideas. This supposition of mathematical autonomy becomes
an important tool for the Modernist text’s appeal to anti-representational
and self-enclosed systemic independence.
Peter Swirski connects mathematics and literature on the basis of their shared
‘autotelism’ (having a purpose in itself) when it comes to their respective
ways of modelling reality [24, page 51]. Mathematics and literature are not
simply modelled on reality. But they themselves, actively model reality as
well. Swirski’s mobilization of mathematics to engage with literature has a
logicist streak:
At the bottom, mathematics is practically synonymous with logic
— the same logic that guides narrative and metanarrative dis-
course. All math is, after all, reducible to properties of integers
which are, in turn, reducible to the modified version of Peano’s
postulates of logic. Mathematics, in this general sense, is logic.
[24, page 52]
This meeting of mathematics and logic resonates with generative possibilities
for literature and mathematics. Oulipo’s (a literary group, we will discuss in
what follows) playful, late-Modernist reflexivity and proceduralism (emphasis
on writing as procedure) activate this combinatorial dimension as ‘potential
literature.’
To radicalize Aristotle’s aforementioned point that literature deals with what
may happen, let us introduce a negation into the formula and maintain that
literature deals with what may not happen. While probability continues to
isolate what is more likely to happen, combinatorial logic and the mathemat-
ical field of ‘combinatorics’ are more interested in the total set of possibili-
ties, opened up by a number of elements in permutations and combinations.
Arka Chattopadhyay 299
Among all possibilities, some are more likely than others. This is the move
from the possible to the probable. According to Pierre De Laplace, proba-
bility is “the ratio of the number of favourable cases to that of all the cases
possible” [12, page 1329]. In other words, probability is tied to realism as
it privileges the likely over the unlikely. But combinatorics is more distant
from realism because it considers the entire gamut of possibilities where there
are more unlikely ones than likely ones. For example, with 5 elements, we
have 1× 2× 3× 4× 5 = 120 possible arrangements. Unless we bring in the
question of probability through likelihood, all 120 are equally possible. Thus,
to exorcise probability from the combinatorial field is to offer the widest pos-
sible scope to chance. Oulipians are however, clear that their programme is
‘anti-chance.’ Oulipian thinker Claude Berge maintains that potentiality is
uncertain but not a matter of chance. Oulipians know what can happen but
they do not know what will happen [20, page 17]. We can see here an opening
of form that cancels out pure chance. But the uncertainty and ignorance of
what is to come ensure that this form does not become a regulated system.
2. Oulipo and Calvino: Chance and Freedom with Forms
As a literary group, Oulipo practices ‘proceduralism.’ Oulipian writers set
a conscious constraint from the beginning and write around that to explore
how a text can be made without something as essential as the vowel ‘e.’
Georges Perec, the famous French Oulipian writer, composed an entire novel,
A Void (La Disparition in French) without the aforementioned vowel in 1969.
A poet, mathematician and founding member of Oulipo, Jacques Roubaud
comments that Oulipo’s idea of ‘voluntary literature’ is in part, a reaction
against the Surrealist stress on unconscious automatism [20, page 87]. In
opposition to the Surrealists’ belief that psychic automatism is a pathway to
creative freedom, Oulipians hold that constraints lead to freedom by realiz-
ing potential literature. Roubaud finds in Raymond Queneau’s works, not
only a “lively refusal of chance” but also a “refusal of the frequent equation
of chance and freedom” (ibid). Oulipians make an explicit appeal toward
Bourbakian set theory and David Hilbert’s project of creating a sense of play
in the mathematical domain when they develop analogous ideas of literary
axiomatization and formalization. As David Aubin argues in [2], Bourbaki
acts like a ‘cultural connector’ for Oulipians. The Oulipian programme of
constrained textual structures comes from Bourbaki’s axiomatic agenda:
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[. . . ] a sufficiently explicit mathematical text could be expressed
in a conventional language containing only a small number of
fixed “words”, assembled according to a syntax consisting a small
number of unbreakable rules: such a text is said to be formalized.
([4, page 7]; emphasis original)
Oulipo anchors itself on the idea of having a simple constraint as the compo-
sitional principle of a text. The constraint limits combinatorial possibilities
and challenges the writer to take up trajectories that she would probably not
take otherwise. It is significant that Oulipians do not activate the realistic
trope of probability to delimit the realm of possibilities. What they trigger
instead is the logico-mathematical mode of axiomatic constraint to frame
the combinatorial field. Likelihood and the associated question of reality are
thus supplemented by the artificial nature of structural constraint. In their
view, it is this quality that makes their aesthetic position, anti-aleatory. To
return to our question, does this turn literature into a system? We will come
back to this point.
Mathematical logic for Oulipo is a tool to go against chance. But as Roubaud
suggests in his analysis of Queneau, the project of mathematizing language
has to process two conjectures: “arithmetic applied to language gives rise
to texts” and “language producing texts gives rise to arithmetic” [20, page
82]. This is a question of causality. It returns us to the Platonic debate
around mathematical autonomy. Is language inherently mathematical or do
we extrapolate mathematics from language? In other words, does mathe-
matical structure cause language or language cause mathematical structure?
If mathematical structures condition language, they would have to be inde-
pendent of language, i.e., autonomous. We can already see how the dialectic
of chance and constraint around the notion of systemicity responds to the
question of autonomy. French mathematician, Henri Poincare´ in his land-
mark essay, ‘Mathematical Creation’ [22], is categorical that invention in
mathematics does not lie in making new combinations. For him, most of the
supposed totality of combinations are “entirely sterile” and only a “small
minority” is “fruitful” (page 2043). We are back to the question of choosing
possibilities. Do we choose certain possibilities over others because they are
more likely to take place or are more useful than others?
To come to our writer now, Italo Calvino became a full member of Oulipo
in 1973 but he had been in touch with the group before that. Part of what
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follows will disturb the neat chronology of Calvino’s Oulipian streak and his
critically accepted transition from Italian neo-realism to Oulipian experimen-
talism. Our reading of ‘The Burning of the Abominable House’ is consistent
with its first Italian publication in 1973—the same year that Calvino sub-
scribed to Oulipo in the fullest sense. But when we come to the titular story
of his early collection, ‘Numbers in the Dark,’ the matter becomes more com-
plex. This is a 1958 story which not only predates Calvino’s Oulipian turn
but also Oulipo’s official inauguration as a group in 1960. The mathemat-
ical reading of this story would help us understand Calvino’s prefiguration
of Oulipianism in the so-called ‘realistic’ phase of his writing. It will also
explain why joining Oulipo was perhaps an automatic choice for this mathe-
matically minded writer. It is interesting that Anna Botta, in her article [3]
on Calvino and Oulipo, does not even mention the two stories that we will
be reading here. The two selected stories are low-lying in the Calvino canon,
especially in the Anglophone critical context.2 It is indeed my intention to
acknowledge the importance of these stories in a discussion of mathematical
thinking within European Modernism. The mathematical strand of Calvino’s
work is often taken for granted but it is not subjected to a rigorous anal-
ysis.3 As we shall see, what Dani Cavallaro suggests about Calvino’s 1968
work, Cosmicomics, is also true of some of the earlier pre-Oulipian stories
like ‘Numbers in the Dark.’ According to Cavallaro, Calvino takes
the idea of structure at its most rigorous and on pushing a sys-
tem’s organizing proclivities to their extreme. Structure is here
envisaged in fundamentally geometric, mathematical and alge-
braic terms: it is concerned with endlessly varied and reiterated
transformative operations which may be formulated in a scientific
(or mockscientific) fashion. [9, page 94]
While we will return to this matrix of ‘structure’ or form vis-a`-vis the notion
of a mathematical system, let me mention some existing work on Calvino
and mathematics. Illeana Moreno-Viqueira’s doctoral dissertation [19] un-
dertakes a mathematical reading of Calvino through Godel’s incompleteness
2Harold Bloom’s edited volume [5] on Calvino as a short-story writer, for example, does
not provide a reading of either stories.
3See [23, 15, 25, 18, 9] and so on. These English language book-length studies on
Calvino contain either no mention of mathematics or just a passing reference to it.
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theorem, among others. But it remains limited to his 1972 novel, The Invisi-
ble Cities. Kerstin Pilz passingly mentions mathematics as a ‘metalanguage’
in Calvino [21, page 40]. This echoes Roubaud’s aforementioned conjectures
on the complex causality that binds mathematics and language.
Calvino’s work has recently attracted mathematicians as well. Gabriele Lolli’s
reading [16] of Calvino’s Six Memos (1988) is a case in point. The math-
ematician reads mathematics from a literary perspective and not the other
way around. Lolli connects Calvino’s literary memos to mathematical dis-
course and reflects how his analysis of the minimalist quality of folk tales
evokes the compositional shape of mathematical proofs. We will not take
this critical path but rather push the question of philosophy of mathematics
in Calvino. As we shall see, the philosophical dimension of mathematics as a
discourse is played out here in terms of a dialectical tension between the real
and the fantastic on the one hand and chance and method, on the other.
Calvino makes a significant critical move by bringing in the technological
apparatus of the computer in his mathematical approach to literature. In
his essay, ‘Prose and Anticombinatorics,’ Calvino reflects on the function of
the machine in the composition of the story, ‘The Burning of the Abom-
inable House.’ Before coming to this story, let me make the point that for
Calvino, the computer introduces an anti-combinatorial dimension. This is
not unlike what Poincare´ had observed in a more general context. Calvino ar-
gues that “among a large number of possibilities, the computer selects those
few realizations compatible with certain constraints” [20, page 143]. So, for
Calvino, the computer narrows down possibilities rather than throwing open
the entire combinatorial field. This goes well with Poincare´‘s previously cited
point that only a “small minority” of all possible combinations turns out to
be “fruitful.” Calvino ends his essay on a note of affirming chance by alluding
to the Pre-Socratic notion of ‘clinamen’ as the sudden swerve among atoms
that leads to their mutual encounter. He observes that the computer does
not replace the creative act of the artist. For him, it liberates the writer
from ‘the slavery of combinatory search, allowing him also the best chance
of concentrating on this “clinamen” which, alone can make of the text a true
work of art’ [20, page 152].
This claim overturns the Oulipian position against chance by affirming an
aesthetic of ‘clinamen’, i.e., an aesthetic that is open to chance. Mechani-
cal computation here becomes the mathematical paradigm that goes against
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combinatorics and opens up chance. In his essay on the writer Samuel Beck-
ett, the French philosopher Gilles Deleuze defines the combinatorial as the
“art or science of exhausting the possible, through inclusive disjunctions”
[13, page 5]. Deleuze’s classification of the combinatorial as an alternation
between art and science (‘or’) is interesting. He defines it through the opera-
tion of exhaustion that can include a possibility which stands in contradiction
to other possibilities, laid out by the same situation. Does the exhaustion
of possibilities expose a void that opens the process to radical contingency?
If through exhaustion we arrive at nothing that can happen, can everything
happen from that point of the nothing? Stated differently, when all possi-
bilities of a given scenario are exhausted, do we arrive at the freedom of a
chance that has been comprehensively traversed? Can we count on chance
to return once the realm of possibilities is exhausted? Calvino’s short stories
work with this material combinatorial rubric. They respond to the question
of contingency and chance by deploying computational framework. We will
see how Calvino gestures toward an alternative to conventional literary re-
alism based on correspondence with external reality. This new possibility
is generative and yet deeply political in asserting the agency of the subject
amid the technocratic noise of computational mathematics.
3. ‘The Burning of the Abominable House’: Infinity between Form
and System?
Calvino writes his 1973 short story ‘The Burning of the Abominable House,’
on a computer. He also uses the device as a theme within the narrative.
The story is about a computer analyst and programmer who is hired by an
insurance company to reconstruct what transpired in a burnt down boarding
house. His only clue is a charred copybook with twelve entries in alphabetical
order. The list of items indicates things that might have happened to the
four tenants. The insurance company wants details about the accident and
the narrator is put on this programming mission. The twelve entries describe
action-terms such as ‘blackmail,’ ‘drugging,’ ‘incitement to suicide,’ ‘slander,’
‘snooping’ etc. As the narrator speculates, each of the four tenants can be
either perpetrators or victims of these actions. Even if it is taken for granted
that each deed was committed by only one person and inflicted upon one
other, the number of possibilities is humungous. The text calculates this set
of all possibilities as “eight thousand eight hundred and seventy-four billion,
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two hundred and ninety-six million, six hundred and seventy-two thousand,
two hundred and fifty-six” [7, page 157]. These are not simply numbers.
Each possible occurrence introduces a narrative tangent with a certain de-
gree of probability. Some of these alternatives realistically cancel others by
rendering them ‘improbable’ and redundant. As the narrator processes these
complexities, we go back to Poincare´’s point about plenitude and choice. We
might have a huge number of possibilities but it all comes down to a slim set of
probable ones. The narrator randomizes these combinations to see how some
of the actions would fit one tenant more than others. He also observes that
if one thing happens, the other cannot happen. Each possibility generates
a fresh story with these characters in a two-by-two structure. The narrator
thus oscillates between the probable and the possible: “who can rule out the
notion that the most improbable alternative might be the only possible?”
(page 159). He pictures in his mind, the unlikely and yet possible situation
where ‘seduction,’ one of the enlisted action-terms, is performed by the old
widow Roessler. As the narrator carries on with his computational narrative
hypotheses, readers are constantly reminded of Skiller (evoking skill?), the
insurance company representative who is coming soon to meet the narrator
and discuss his findings.
As the writer’s imaginative juices start flowing, it becomes clear that the im-
probable is also possible. This takes us from probability into combinatorics
which deals with the entire set of possibilities. While speculating the un-
likely makes for a fascinating leap of imagination, the narrator realizes that
he must work out a “system of exclusions” (page 161). The computer is, as
Calvino argues in his aforementioned piece, the narrator’s anti-combinatoric
companion. The narrator is convinced that it will be able to discard millions
of “incongruous combinations” and keep only the “plausible concatenations.”
As we can see, rather than chance, the technology of computation reinforces
probability wherein we continue to talk about the plausible. The pure chance
aspect of the combinatorial is revised and restricted by a logic of computa-
tion. It eliminates implausible situations like tying someone first and then
threatening him or knifing and strangling as well as threatening with a gun.
Only one of these many possibilities could have taken place. They cannot
happen together. The story depicts a struggle between the subjective agency
of creativity and the mechanical world of combinations. For the machine,
these are “anonymous and interchangeable” “factors and functions” but for
the narrator, they are identifiable human characters in concrete scenarios.
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He finally makes peace with himself by submitting to the machine’s logic in
which human lives are informatized: “It is information I am dealing with,
not human lives, with their good and evil sides” (page 163). The story ac-
centuates the material transformation of narrative into data and the narrator
registers narrative pieces as “holes on punchcards” (page 164).
The twelve action-items fundamentally exclude the cause of the fire. We
do not have a single item in the list that mentions the fire. They explain
the death of the inhabitants but cannot tell us how the fire started. The
story takes a whodunit turn when the narrator begins to suspect Skiller,
his client and wonders whether he is the culprit, behind the accident. He
is aware that if Skiller is added to the set, he becomes the fifth element of
the set, after the four tenants. But in spite of this addition, the number of
possibilities does not increase because he is added only as the suspected evil
mastermind. In other words, he is seen in only one role, i.e. the one who
burns down the house and does not perform any of the twelve action-items.
If starting the fire is his sole function, all the action items remain distributed
among the four tenants. Skiller is just a plus-one. His addition does not
alter the total count of possibilities. The computer would not be able to
think this problem through. For the machine, Skiller is the fifth element
and the combinatorial would now have to be a factorial operation, involving
five agents and twelve items. This would shoot up the total number of
possibilities. The narrator however can and does acknowledge this situation.
Herein lies his human subjectivity, as opposed to the machine that represents
the technological progress of corporate capitalism. This subjective thinking
supplements the machine’s way of manoeuvring elements. There is a similar
subjectivist reaction against technocracy when the computer gets affected by
an unknown error and all data is lost. Is this a characteristically humanist
and subjectivist resistance against technological domination? The story is
more complicated. It allows us to read the error and the data loss as an
index of the narrator’s self-cancelling and doubtful imagination that has been
making and unmaking narrative possibilities.
As the narrator resumes work after the data loss, he inserts one more char-
acter into the story to make the tally go up to six. This character is he,
himself—the computer analyst, Waldemar. Once again, in spite of the ad-
dition of one character, the narrative possibilities do not proliferate be-
cause he sees Waldemar in a static narrative position. Waldemar, the nar-
rator, imagines himself to be yet another tenant in the boarding house.
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He also wonders if Skiller is coming in for a research inspection on the role of
household factors in disasters and in the process, hatching a fire plot. These
insertions are results of subjective decisions and the extra two characters af-
ter the initial four are brought in with singular roles. Waldemar, like Skiller,
is not going to perform any of the twelve action items. So, the tally remains
the same. This is a way of limiting the vast play of the combinatorial in
which the entire field of the possible is at stake. Having said that, this is
not probability either. It is not on the basis of likelihood that the narrator
brings Skiller and himself into the narrative. Mathematically speaking, this
self-inclusion reminds us of the set-theoretical axiom of foundation that en-
sures, a set cannot be added to itself as one of its elements. So, when the
narrator imports himself into the programme, he must maintain himself as a
discrete unit and not as an addition to the list of four victims.
The story here incorporates computer programming into the crime to give
it a cybernetic dimension. Waldemar speculates whether the insurance com-
pany is conspiring to introduce useless data as ‘smokescreen’ to cover over
the crime, each time the accident is attempted to be reconstructed. In this
conjecture, the list of twelve action-items is a deliberately misleading infor-
mational “noise.” Skiller’s plan is to take the misleading clues to an ignorant
programmer like Waldemar in order to check whether the actual causality
of the crime can be established. While inserting himself into the narrative,
Waldemar realizes that he is only one item in a largely unknown series. He
is a cog within a gigantic and enigmatic mechanical series: “I’m stuck here
inputting and outputting the data of a story I can’t change. [. . . ] Perhaps
even Skiller only has an input-output function: the real computer is else-
where” (page 168). The computer as a trope is repositioned at this narrative
juncture. Previously, it was on the side of realistic probability but now, the
computer becomes symbolic of infinite seriality and indeterminacy. The in-
finite is a figure of this limit of what can be known. It is a frontier where
knowledge passes into the unknown. Is this serial notion of infinity as that
which cannot be known, a question of form or system? In other words, where
does infinity sit between form and system? Does it make the difference be-
tween the two? I would argue that infinity is precisely what prevents this
literary and mathematical formalization from being reified into a system. As
and when a form threatens to become a complete and self-sufficient system
of mastery, there is an aspect of the infinite that comes and saves the day
for the form. The infinitesimal form remains irreducible to system.
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It would be useful to evoke the contemporary French philosopher Quentin
Meillassoux’s distinction between ‘chance’ and ‘contingency’ here. Oulipo
makes a notable gesture toward set-theory to ground the combinatorial ques-
tion. To tackle the tension between aleatorics and anti-aleatorics in Oulipo,
I would evoke Meillassoux’s derivations from Cantor’s transfinite theory of
sets on the particular question of chance. This evocation connects Calvino’s
story and its thesis on chance and system with the larger sphere of philosophy
of mathematics. Oulipians are drawn to infinitesimal possibilities introduced
by set-theory. Cantor’s invention of the transfinite is a climax of this open-
ing. For Meillassoux, Cantorian transfinite allows us to make a mathematical
distinction between chance and contingency [17, page 104]. In Meillassoux’s
words, the transfinite makes “totalization of the thinkable” into an impossi-
bility, when we take this totalization in an a priori sense. So, the transfinite
denotes a “detotalization of number.” Meillassoux formulates this Cantorian
thesis in the following way: “the (quantifiable) totality of the thinkable is un-
thinkable” (ibid). In a recent book on mathematics and modernist literature,
Literary Infinities [6], Baylee Brits has mobilized Cantor’s theory of actual
infinity as something that “may have measure but not determination” (page
3). This idea of an indeterminate measure is consistent with detotalization
as the essence of infinity. The infinite is what can be measured but never be
determined. It returns us to the tension between form and system. It is a
form that through the act of measurement, moves toward systematicity. But
due to indeterminacy, it never attains the condition of a system. So, infinity
is the difference between form as a formalizing process and systematicity as
a completion of that form. Infinity makes sure that the form remains a form
and does not attain a systemic order.
In After Finitude [17], Meillassoux generates a reading of Cantor in which we
have one axiom to support that “the possible is untotalizable” (page 105).
This formulation creates a “fundamental uncertainty regarding the totaliz-
ability of the possible” (ibid). Chance is premised on totalization of the
possible but Meillassoux remains sceptical about this totalization. Stated
differently, chance is all about realizing all possible possibilities that do not
appear likely or plausible to us. For Meillassoux, possibilities can never
be totalized, thanks to infinity. He argues for the necessity of contingency.
Here contingency is opened up by the detotalization of the possible. So,
contingency is not totalization. It is instead a detotalization of possibilities.
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As Meillassoux reflects on the ‘clinamen,’ (the Pre-Socratic thesis that atoms
swerve by chance and meet one another), chance always “presupposes im-
mutability of physical laws” (page 99). He goes on to say that chance itself
is a law of the universe. Chance is built on condition that there are “unal-
terable physical laws” (ibid). For Meillassoux, it is transfinite mathematics
that ultimately creates the key distinction between chance and contingency
by generating uncertainty about totalization of possibilities. Contingency is
the name for this mathematical detotalization. Here we have one possible
answer to Calvino’s particular question, if not the more general Oulipian
question. If we cannot totalize the possible, we can never truly exhaust the
combinatorial. It is not chance that returns here. Absolute contingency is
what returns through this process of detotalization. Meillassoux’s equation
of chance with physical law goes against the Oulipian identification of con-
straint with freedom. If chance is a law in itself, it cannot lead to freedom.
This seems to reinforce the Oulipian intuition that chance is a pathway to
freedom. But Meillassoux’s claim that chance is a law in itself turns chance
into a constraint. It collapses Oulipo’s juxtaposition of chance and con-
straint. Meillassoux’s thinking foregrounds how mathematics is integral to
Oulipo’s quest for freedom through constraint formation that denies chance.
Transfinite mathematics exudes contingency as an absolute. It jettisons the
false opposition of chance and constraint. This collapse obstructs the sys-
tematicity of both mathematics and literature.
To return to Calvino’s text, narrative hypotheses open up the possibility that
Skiller is yet another input-output programme and the machine that lies at
the root of this serial structure of crimes is somewhere else. This is a transfi-
nite opening of contingency as a detotalization of possibilities. The moment
the story accepts this conspiracy hypothesis, the twelve to the power twelve
possibilities that lay in the gutted copybook are eliminated. This is where to-
talization fails. What we have instead is an uncertain opening of transfinite
contingency. The pure chance that nestled in the copybook list of possi-
bilities is abandoned in favour of an uncertain and contingent infinity. The
computational structure of the machine has its role in this contingent schema.
The contingency is thus made necessary by the ending. The story ends with
Waldemar, remembering how Skiller has skilfully pre-planned Waldemar’s
murder by setting fire to the lab, to pass it off as arson. As someone, (per-
haps Skiller) rings the door and Waldemar hears the fire brigade’s sirens,
he gets ready to shoot Skiller. The story ends in this suspended moment.
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On the one hand, this ending consolidates the insurance company crime
hypothesis. But on the other, it also complicates the same possibility by
suggesting that Waldemar is the murderer of the tenants, living in Widow
Roessler’s boarding house. In this view, all the rest would be regarded as a
concoction of his criminal imagination. This is another point of detotaliza-
tion. The story both opens and closes these possibilities. It pressurizes the
pure chance of the combinatorial, not with the realism of probability, but
with an imaginative leap that generates a cybernetic crime narrative and at
the same time, keeps it in suspension. The technologically filtered mathemat-
ical theme of computation becomes instrumental in this move from chance to
contingency. We traverse this space of radical indeterminacy, that is opened
by infinity as de-totalization. This notion of infinity as an impossibility of
framing all possibilities makes the difference between form and system.
4. ‘Numbers in the Dark’: A Mathematical Mythology of Error
We will now go back in time from 1970s to late 1950s and discuss a pre-Oulipo
story by Calvino. This will show how he was always driven toward mathe-
matical themes, even before his association with the mathematically minded
Oulipian writers began. If ‘The Burning of the Abominable House,’ featured
a computer error leading to data loss, the 1958 story, ‘Numbers in the Dark’
is a mythologization of mathematical error. The critique of technological
capitalism is prominent here. The story revolves around Paolino, a cleaning
woman’s son who explores the accountancy office. The little boy helps his
mother emptying the bins. The story begins with a self-reflexive “geometric
scenario” of the city space that takes us to the accountancy office building
in “broad rectangles of unshaded light” [7, page 79]. The geography of the
urban space is mapped in a mathematical way. This makes the accountancy
office, an element in a larger mathematical set. As Paolino travels through
geometrically neat cubicle spaces in the deserted office where machines are
asleep for the time being, he comes across a skinny old man, at work on his
“old adding machine” (page 86). When Paolino strikes up a conversation, he
gets to know the strange story of error. This mythical history of the error sug-
gests that the accounts can never be set right. The accountant takes Paolino
through a spiral staircase to a cell where all old company ledgers are archived.
He shows him the simple error made by Annibale De Canis, the company’s
first accountant who is widely regarded as a legendary keeper of figures.
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This short story, unlike ‘The Burning of the Abominable House,’ situates
‘error’ on the side of the human, as opposed to the machine. When the ac-
countant tells Paolino that all figures are wrong, the boy’s first question is
whether or not, it is a machine error. In fact, he wonders if machines can
ever be erroneous. This indicates our cultural assumption about omnipotent
machines and their error-free regime. The error in this case comes from the
human. It is made by the so-called infallible accounting genius, De Canis.
This point echoes Georges Perec’s liking for Paul Klee’s Oulipian formula:
“Genius is the error in the system” [20, page 20]. As the witty remark sug-
gests, the category of the genius is itself so mistaken that it can generate an
error in a system. Calvino’s story extends this formulation by turning the
genius himself into a generator of error in the system. This is an error that
delivers a lethal blow to calculative rationality and its underlying assump-
tion of systematicity. It breaks the system apart and takes it back to a form
that produces a deadlock. The model of corporate capitalism, symbolized
by the accountancy office, is built on calculation as the infallible hallmark
of rationality, be it the reasoning of the human or that of the machines. De
Canis’s error sabotages this entire system. It is a trace of dissidence that
does not allow this calculative form to become a system.
The accountant tells Paolino that no one apart from him knows about this
error. Now that he is old and nearing death, he wants to transmit the secret
truth of the error. The error in question is a minor one of “four hundred and
ten lire in addition” but its exponential growth with all following calculations
is critical: “Over all these years, you know what that mistake of four hundred
and ten lire has become? Billions! Billions!” [7, page 88]. So, the error is
imagined to be growing more impactful, like a festering wound. It mocks the
infallible precision of computing machine: “The calculating machines and
electronic brains and what not can grind out numbers all they like. The
mistake is right at the core, beneath all their numbers, and it’s growing
bigger and bigger and bigger!” (ibid). This error is an aleatory aesthetic
agent. Error, is almost by definition, a matter of chance. It comes into
being through the mythological act of storytelling, conducted by the old
accountant. It introduces an unknown variation in the seemingly invariable
domain of calculative rationality. This sabotages the edifice of the company
and by extension the technocratic mechanism of capital. The accountant’s
increasingly expansive imagination captures this nuance of mathematics as
mythology, if not fantasy:
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Half the city is built on these mistakes! No, not half the city, what
am I saying? Half the country! And the exports and imports?
All wrong, the whole world is distorted by this mistake, the only
mistake in the life of Annibale De Canis, the master of book-
keeping, that giant of accountancy, that genius! (page 88)
This is how a literary text uses a mathematical theme and turns it into a
narrative—a story of human error that gives a certain degree of poignancy to
this mythical account. It is a literary and aesthetic appropriation of mathe-
matics into the order of myth and legend. Calvino’s story keeps the question
of truth in suspension. It cannot verify what the accountant says. We do
not know if he is lying. The mathematical myth seems to have a truth of its
own. It is a stroke of ironic paradox that this truth lies in error.
The mythology of this error is unmistakably subjective. It introduces inde-
terminacy and inoperativity in the monstrous world of capitalism that func-
tions through big data and gigantic numbers. This error might be induced
by chance. But it interacts with the system that it is part of. It detotalizes
possibilities by marking out a particular pattern of numerical proliferation
from four hundred and ten. This specific pattern will grow on. It has the in-
certitude of a contingent transfinite opening that connects the present short
story with the one we discussed above. When the accountant links De Canis’s
error with the city-space in the quote above, we realise how the immaculate
spatial geometry of the city is corroded by this seed of destruction. The
sabotaging function of human error vis-a`-vis the capitalist regime of num-
bers is made all the more insistent when the accountant leaves, with his last
sentence, ringing in Paolino’s ears: “I’m sure he [Annibale De Canis] did it
on purpose!” (page 89).
The story ends on an ambiguous note with another error. We are told that
there is a phone-call from Brazil to the accountancy office at the wrong hour
when only the cleaners are there. As the narrator marks this error by noting
how they “muddled up the time difference” (page 89), we get a glimpse
of the ‘world’ that the old accountant had mentioned. It is a world, mis-
connected by mistakes that migrate from chance to contingency. This ‘missed
call,’ to use a more contemporary technological language, goes against the
systematicity of the system. The world lies suspended in these missed calls.
It is a formalization that fails on the verge of becoming a system.
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5. Conclusion: Fantasy in Form and Literature against System
To conclude, I want to bring back questions of realism and mathematical
autonomy in relation to the bifidity of contingency and method in Calvino’s
stories. I have argued that systematicity is used against its grain in these
stories. It is mobilized to navigate from pure chance to radical contingency.
In other words, systematicity here, is only a pathway to contingency. It
does not construct a consistent and coherent system in any complete sense.
This is a contradictory, contingent and indeterminate system, if at all. But
at the same time, systemicity is an inevitable means to turn chance into
contingency. To connect this aporetic (flawed, involving a deadlock) system
with realism and autonomy is to ask whether the ‘material’ structures of
mathematical systems can offer an alternative to realism. This would lead
us into a series of questions. What is the nature of reality in these two
stories? Do the mathematical structures imitate reality? Alternatively, do
these stories pin a mathematical fantasy, independent of reality?
Let me follow my argument regarding the materiality of mathematical struc-
tures, that act as a supplement to realism. Seen this way, ‘The Burning
of the Abominable House’ demonstrates how computational machinery can
generate a mathematical structure that only seems to simulate reality, but
actually does not. This complex cybernetic series produces a selective appro-
priation, distortion, and thus a complete supplementation of reality. Real-
istic verisimilitude (textual structure mirroring external reality) suffers here
as mathematical structure institutes its own reality. As we have seen, this
independence of mathematical structure is not without its own politics. It
has a distinct ideological quality. Technology in its capitalist avatar instru-
mentalizes mathematical structures and flirts with the idea of a complete
and self-reliant system. This is the supposed autonomy of mathematical sys-
tems, freed from realistic dependence on external reality. But as we have
seen, Calvino’s story exposes the ideological determinations that underwrite
this autonomy. It offers a critique of the corporate capitalist model that
backs this mathematical instrumentalism.
Computer becomes the matter that embodies this conspiratorial computa-
tional series. In our first story, Calvino’s mathematical materialism regis-
ters a political critique of technological capitalism as a domain of radical
contingency. However, it is the same contingency that also creates agency.
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The system remains open to de-construction due to the contingency it pro-
duces on its own. In ‘Numbers in the Dark,’ Calvino’s critique of system-
aticity is more evident. The humanity of error, as against the supposedly
unerring mechanical structures, anchors this critique. Fantasy is an impor-
tant component here. Is the old accountant fantasizing about the error? Do
we believe him? Even if there is an actual error in the accounts that infects
the entire statistical structure, is the accountant not deluded to think that
this error will bring in any serious change?
The error that lies at the core of the entire process of counting will remain
unknown and neglected. The world will go on with its business without the
least irregularity. Nothing will change for that error. But in the accountant’s
obsessional fantasy, the erroneous number that grows out of the deep dark
nadir of calculation and outgrows the dark is a primordial accumulation of
surplus numbers. This mythological excess will haunt the capitalist regime
of computation. This phantasm of the error brings mathematics closer to an
alternative reality that supplements the capitalist imagination. Mathemat-
ics in this literary appropriation, remains committed to political material-
ism. We are not surprised to know about Calvino’s strong association with
left-wing politics in Italy.4 This mathematical fantasy must be seen as an
autonomous material structure that has the agency to topple the reality of
realistic mirroring. This fantastic autonomy is the exact opposite of the ideo-
logical autonomy of technological and instrumental mathematical structures
that we have spotted in the first story. This autonomy is an act of libera-
tion. Fantasy has the courage to imagine an alternative to the degenerate
capitalist reality. While the previous autonomy was technological, this one
is subjective.
Here we return to the question of realism versus autonomy. Let me mobilize
fantasy as a political trope that appropriates mathematical thinking in litera-
ture. The fantasy trope has a clear connection with mathematics in ‘Numbers
in the Dark.’ It has its place in ‘The Burning of the Abominable House,’ if we
consider Waldemar’s computational composition as an extended act of fan-
tasmatic concoction. The infinity imagined by Waldemar creates a literary
fantasy. It brackets out system from form. For the mathematician Gabriele
4Calvino was a member of the Italian Communist Party until August 1957. Even after
his resignation from the party, he called himself a communist for life. For more see his
letters [8].
314 Mathematical Possibilities in Modernism
Lolli who does not approach Calvino’s early stories, “in Calvino’s work we
find examples of products of fantasy that stem from some scientific sugges-
tion” [16, page 50]. Calvino not only treats literature as an extended fantasy
based on mathematical science, as Lolli would have it, but he also locates
acts of mathematical fantasy in his texts as implementations of autonomous
reality. Autonomy from the reality of realism through mathematical fantasy
is the political edge of this aesthetic. Waldemar and the accountant in the
two stories are human agents who enact a non-realistic and generative notion
of literary reality that goes against the correspondence-driven idea of realism.
Mathematics becomes their structural and material support to fantasize an
alternative and constructivist reality. It evokes a systematicity but only to
go beyond it.
The literary fantasies of infinite computers in the first story and an infinitely
growing number in the second one, make sure that form is not totalized into
a system. These are formalizations that turn mathematics into a literary
theme. But the literary prevents these forms from becoming totalistic and
totalitarian systems. Literature involves this hesitation between form and
system. Be it fantasy or infinity, or the gap between chance and contingency,
there are literary forces that do not allow us to christen these deforming
forms as systems. Formalization converts the law of chance into contingency.
This conversion is the mathematical function of a structure that resists sys-
tematicity. Calvino’s stories thus become crucial in a historical sequence of
late-modernism that uses mathematics to tantalize us with the possibility of
a literary systematicity. But it withdraws itself from the positivist trap of
turning literature into a consistent and complete system.
The possibility of literature becoming a system is raised but finally left dan-
gling. It is an impossibility that needs to be demonstrated as impossible.
This is a double bind. Meillassoux names this tendency, an “absolutizing
thought that would not be absolutist” ([17, page 34]; emphases original).
This absolutization without the formation of the absolute, translates into a
tension between system and structure (c.f. the Cavallaro quote at the be-
ginning of this article). Structure here is a remnant of form that breaks
systematicity. For me, this critical modulation crystallizes one particular
efficacy of mathematical and logical structures for European literary Mod-
ernism. Mathematical and logical thinking constitute a battleground for the
dialectical interplay of form and system, chance and contingency and finally,
realism and autonomy.
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